Dynamics of the anti-establishment: a shattered front-line and what it means for Hong Kong’s legislative election
This article serves the purpose of explaining the current political landscape in Hong Kong on the anti-establishment side. Articles and systematic information about this part of the city’s political scene is lacking but is important for anyone who is interested in this topic.
Clashes resumed on Mother’s Day night in one of the busiest districts in Hong Kong. Legislators were assaulted and over a hundred civilians were arrested for unlawful assembly or violating the government’s prohibition on gathering. Soon will come the one-year anniversary of the anti-extradition law movement and many speculate the return of violent clashes in Hong Kong. These factors cloud the prospects of the future of the city, and more importantly, the election of its legislature, LegCo, in September.
This year’s election is considered the ‘end-game’ by both the establishment and the anti-establishments. The anti-establishments have set out the goal of ‘35+’ early in January, aiming at seizing over half of the seats in LegCo. They believe failure to achieve such a goal will give Beijing mandate and stronger claims to tighten its grasp on the city’s freedom. For Beijing, should the opposition succeed, they fear the loss of control over executive power and thus turning Hong Kong into a bulwark of foreign interference
So, the important question here is, will the anti-establishments succeed? Given their landslide victory in last November’s District Council election, many commentators and Beijing forecasted this to become reality.
But unity under the ‘35+’ banner is not happening. Over the last few weeks, as the epidemic in Hong Kong is relaxed, infighting, political poke-in-the-rib within the anti-establishments resumed. Sources have reported, discussions within the camp over whether a primary should be held is in stalemate. Unity and a clear road map cannot be drawn and the selection of a two-term legislator to run for the Democratic Party ticket sparked an outcry online.
Why can’t they come together?
To start with, many are challenging the notion of such a goal, saying that the design of the electoral system would not allow the anti-establishments hold over 35 seats. For those who don’t know, LegCo is made up of geographical constituencies (seats for all registered voters depending on their residence) and functional constituencies (seats designated for different professionals or industries). Under this system, the anti-establishments have never been able to capture more than 32 seats despite continuously gaining approximately 60% of votes. Within the camp, there have always been debates over whether they should run in functional constituencies, with some believe that these seats are unjust and go against democratic principles.
Another debate surrounding the prospect of 35+ is ‘what comes next?’ Demosito, a new generation political party led by young activist Joshua Wong, have said once 35+ becomes reality, they will block the Budget and therefore force the Chief Executive to dismiss LegCo as instructed by the Basic Law, the city’s mini constitution. By doing so, it fulfills the party’s promise of ‘mutual destruction’ with Beijing. This idea, however, is not fully supported by the more traditional and conservative Democratic Party and Civic Party, whose voter base is comprised mostly of middle-class professionals who favor stability and considers many of the younger generation’s actions to be too radical.
The ‘generation gap’ within the camp is even more visible when one considers the rising Localists and Independent group whose call for Hong Kong to become an independent state is gaining momentum among the teens. Though they do not share a same voter base with the traditional parties, the localists attack have cost traditional parties the voters’ trust. All in all, the current fragmentation caused by ideological or strategic differences is not helpful in reaching the 35+ goal. And these differences are deep and wide.
Everybody’s Game
But ideological or strategical differences aside, elections are fundamentally about who gets the votes to win the seats. But simply by looking at the numbers, things get even trickier for the anti-establishments.
Back in the days, major parties in the pan-democrats (former brand for the anti-establishments) would work-out, through a series of peaceful negotiations, who would run in which district to maximize the 60% voter base. The Civic Party, a more middle-class and professional leaning party would send two candidates in the Hong Kong island constituency; the more grass-root Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, would stand in the poorer Kowloon West constituency.
But negotiations don’t really work this way anymore as district powers and independent rising-stars who won in last November’s District Council election have atomized support for different groups.
Take the Community Alliance and the Tuen Mun Community Network as examples. These groups came to be after 2010, when the pan-democrats suffered a crisis of confidence after being exposed of conducting back-room negotiations with Beijing over Hong Kong’s political reform. Some of their district councilors left to form these alliances and became district powers controlling a dozen of seats in the district councils.
These district groups have not officially declared their intention to join the race but if they do, they must not be overlooked. Just like many independent candidates in previous elections, they aim at winning ‘the last seat’. Looking at the vote share for New Territory (West) Constituency in the previous election, the last seat was won by Junius Ho with 35,657 votes (~5.91% of votes). Should the Tuen Mun Community Network and its allies run in this constituency, by combining their votes obtained in last November’s District Council Election they can, statistically, secure ‘the final seat’ thus further weakening seat-share of traditional democratic parties.
Primaries for the camp?
The proportional representation system favors discipline and consensus, two things that does not exist within the camp now. And if no agreement can be made before the election, it might ultimately benefit their opponents.
One might say, the most sensible thing to do is to bring it back to the constituents, throw a primary and let them decide. However, according to sources from within the camp, many potential candidates fear that a primary would be used against them because the Electoral Affairs Commission had just amended the definition of a ‘candidate’ and they might generate extra election expenses after ‘publicly declaring an intention to stand as a candidate at the election’ even before the nomination deadline in July.
But even if such amendment does not exist, within the camp, primaries were not favored by everyone. Arguments over the rules and means of these primaries have always been a heated topic within the camp and no one seems to listen to the others’ opinion.
Power to the Middle
Given the disunity within the anti-establishment camp, it is predicted by some from within that the 35+ prospect is close to unattainable. But that does not mean those seats will be filled by the establishments. A likely outcome is none will have an outright majority in both regional or functional constituencies. A new alliance, led by James Tien, might hold these key seats.
James Tien, rebel of the establishment, once led the Liberal Party, a right-leaning pro-establishment party to its biggest election victory in 2003 after they withdrawn support for the National Security Ordinance, or better known as Article 23. Once a favorite of Beijing, he was stripped of his duties in the National Committee after publicly asking former Chief Executive CY Leung to resign amidst the 2014 Umbrella Moment. Since then, he’s become one of the city’s most vocal critics on the establishment and pro-Beijing figures.
He made his intention to ‘do something’ clear in December but was not taken seriously by either side until recently, when prominent figures joined his syndicate. Figures such as former Financial Secretary John Tsang, former Chairman of LegCo Jasper Tsang and young scholar Derek Yuen have affirmed the ‘rational alternative’ image Tien is trying to build for his alliance.
Tien have made it clear, that should they run, they’re aiming only at capturing 2–3 seats to become ‘Kingmaker’ in decisive moments, such as passing the Budget or Article 23 or any controversies bring forth to LegCo.
We’ll have to wait and see
Just hours before this article is published on Medium, the government announced the tentative date of the election to be held on 6th September and nominations will end mid or late July.
From now until then, it might not seem long, but many can happen under today’s political climate. If you’re placing your bets on any one candidate, brace yourself for a loss as there is too much uncertainty going on.
More on the dynamics of the anti-establishments in the upcoming weeks depending on the reception of this article.
